INTRODUCTION

I
NTERCOLLEGIATE athletics has evolved from local, student orgamzed games m the early twentIeth century mto a natIOnal, multi-billion dollar mdustry m the twenty-first century I This development has occurred 10 a context of dynamiC tension between amateUrIsm and student Ideals on the one hand and profeSSIOnalism, competitiveness, and financial gam on the other. The National Collegiate Athletic ASSOCiation (NCAA), the major regulatory association for such mtercolleglate competitions for most of this perIod, has publicly nurtured the Ideal of the "amateur student-athlete" and has mamtamed strIngent and detailed rules and regulatIOns prohibltmg the collegiate athlete from receIVmg any benefit of any kmd based on athletiC talent while he or she retams amateur e1igibility.2 In contrast to thiS NCAA sponsored Image, reports of payments to and preferential treatment for collegiate athletes have been equally prevalent from the begmnmg of the twentieth century 3 The uneasy co-eXIstence between the public perceptIOn of "amateur student-athlete" and the prIvate reality of payments and preferences grew more tense as DIVISion I athletiCS, particularly football and basketball, began to attract natIOnal media attentIOn and to generate millions of dollars 10 IOcome. 4 As the rewards for wmnmg mcreased,
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The mtroductlOn of the agent disrupted the uneasy equilibnum which had been mamtamed for decades between the public Image and the pnvate reality of DivIsion I athletics. The "principles of amateurism" were now bemg flaunted by agents--mdivlduals not under the "institutional control" of any umverslty NCAA sanctions were Imposed on umversltles when no mstltutlonal personnel had been Involved m the Violation of NCAA rules. The century old balance between the illUSion of the "student-athlete" and the reality of payments and preferences, which had allowed mtercolleglate football and basketball to flOUrish, was bemg threatened by the "uncontrolled" activities of the agents. 9 The busmess practices of Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom m the early 1980s brought the new reality of intercollegiate sports to a head. Walters and Bloom were talent agents m the recording mdustry who deCided to represent athletes. In 1986, they Signed a large number of college football players, most of whom were early draft picks, to representation contracts. IO The Immediate success of the duo engendered rumors of extravagant payments to players and the slgmng of post-dated contracts before the expiration of an athlete's eligibility 11 Allegations of Walters' and Bloom's ties to organized crime and their reported phYSical threats to the lives and well-bemg of rival agents and dissatisfied players brought a new level of cnmmality to DIVISion I athletlcs. 12 In the course of numerous laWSUits regarding these two 5. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, art. 12 (Operat1Og Bylaws).
6. See Id. § 19.6, . The NCAA can now also Impose the so-called "death penalty" (ineligibility to field a team) for multiple Violators. These vaned sanctIOns cost the 1Ostitution finanCially and embarrass It nationally. agents, the extent of Intercollegiate corruptIOn was publicly revealed. In a federal cnmInal prosecutIOn of the duo, approximately fifty football players were subpoenaed by the government to testify agaInst Bloom and Walters. 13 All of the players had received money and other valuable consideratIOn In exchange for sIgmng post-dated representatIOn contracts before the begInmng of theIr semor season. The athletes were from every comer of the country and every type of college and umversIty, Including traditIOnally "clean" programs.
14 These activIties finally culmInated m the convIction and sentencIng of Bloom and Walters on five counts of racketeenng and mail fraud. IS The breadth of the corruption and the easy availability of the athletes to the agents shocked the country In response to the public outcry follOWIng these revelations, states began to pass legIslation cnm10alizmg conduct by sports agents that jeopardized a student athlete's eligibility under NCAA rules. 16 ThIS legislative trend IS not directed at helpmg the student-athlete, especIally With graduatIon rates below 40% at many programs and athletes who do procure degrees frequently receIve them m mean10gless majors.
17 By restrIctmg an athlete's ability to discover mformation about hls/her market value, these statutes have been perceIved as part of the monopolistIc structure that depresses player compensatIOn and nghts m an mdustry WhICh grosses billions of dollars from player's efforts. IS The states are therefore usmg theIr legIslative and JudiCial processes to promote the narrowest provmcial goals possible--the competitIve advantage of intercollegiate football and basketball teams withm the state and the grantmg of preferences and payments to athletes only by mstItutIonal representatIves.
These statutes have the effect of glvmg NCAA regulatIOns the full force of law This 10 essence cnmInalizes rules made by a pnvate aSSOCiatIOn to benefit Its own members. Although the use of state law to further the goals of a pnvate entity would predictably have deletenous effects, the obVIOUS disadvantages are conSiderably mcreased when the pnvate entity IS the NCAA and the arena IS 1Otercolleglate DiVISion I athletlcs.
19 NCAA rules are 10credibly detailed and, on theIr face, prohibit the conferral of any student "benefit" because of hIS or her athletic ability 20 Many experts have trouble understanding the tangled maze of NCAA bylaws and mterpretatIons.
21 Inadvertent VIOlatIOns occur With some frequency To aVOid thiS tangled web, many state statutes are tnggered by any contact, even mere speech, between the agent and a student-athlete. 22 In addition, the culture of mtercolleglate § § 8-26-1 to -41 (Supp. 1998) ; ARK. CODE ANN. § § 17-16-101 to -203 (1992) ; CAL. Bus. & PROF CODE § § 18897.1-.97 (West Supp. 1999) ; COLO. REv STAT. ANN. § § 23-16-101 to -108 (West Supp. 1999) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § § 20-553 to 558 (West Supp. 1999) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § § 468.451-4571 (West Supp. 1999) ; GA. CODE ANN. § § 43-4A-1 to -19 (1994) ; IND. CODE ANN. § § 35-46-4-1 to -4 (West 1998) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § § 9A.1-.12 (West 1995) ; KAN.
STAT. ANN. § § 44-1501 to -1515 (1999) ; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § § 164.680-.689 (Banks-BaldwIn Supp. 1998) ; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § § 4:421-'430 (1987 § § 4:421-'430 ( & Supp. 1999 ; MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § § 4-401 to -426 (Supp. 1999 § § 73-41-1 to -23 (1995 § § 73-41-1 to -23 ( & Supp. 1998 ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § § 436.200-.209 (West Supp. 1999) ; NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § § 398.005-.255 (West 1996) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § § 78C-71 to -81 (1990) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § § 9-15-01 to -05 (Supp. 1997) ; OHIO REv CODE ANN. § § 4771.01-.99 (Banks-BaldWIn 1999) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § § 821.61-.71 (West Supp. 1999) ; 5 PA. CONS. STAT. § § 3301-12 (Supp. 1999) ; S.c. CODE ANN. § § 59-102-10 to 50 (Law. Coop. 1998) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § § 49-7-2111 § § 49-7- to -2121 § § 49-7- (1996 § § 49-7- & Supp. 1998 § § 18.175.010-.080 (West Supp. 1999 (1998) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § § 9-15-01 to -02 (1998) ; WASH. REv CODE ANN. § § 18.175.030-.070 (West Supp 1998) .
34. See ALA. CODE § § 8-26-24 to -41 (1998) ; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § § 18895.2-.93 (West Supp. 1998) ; COLO. REv STAT. ANN. § § 23-16-102 to -105 (West Supp. 1998) § § 49-7-2111 to -2113 (1998 [Vol. 30
Registration requirements reveal a more disparate pattern of regulatIOn. A number of states do not require registration With the state or a postmg of a surety bond pnor to the contactmg of or contractmg With a student-athlete. 36 Other states requITe state registratIOn but do not mandate the postmg of a surety band. 37 Finally, a third group reqUires central registration and the postmg of a surety bond, With the required bond amounts rangmg from $10,000 to $100,000. 38 The maJonty of the states that reqUire registration specify that the mformatIon be filed with the Secretary ofState.
39 The other states delineate a different state offiCial to be 10 charge of registration, most typically a Commissioner of Consumer Protection or a special Agent Regulatory Commlsslon. 40 A recent trend IS to test prospecttve agents on various sports law tOpICS 10 addition to requmng an application, background check, and fee. 41 Many states exempt members of the state's bar from the registration reqUirements.
42
The substantive provIsions of the statutes usually center on contact With the student-athlete and/or contractmg with the student-athlete. A number of states do not regulate contact at all, but merely focus on the event of contract executton. 43 For those that do regulate contact, a small number of states Impose an outnght ban on contact between an agent and a student-athlete. 44 The others mandate that no contact § § 71-41-01 to -99 (1998) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § § 78C 71 to 78 (1998) (1998) .
43. See MICH. COMPo LAWS. § 750.411e (1998) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § § 49-7-2111 to -2113 (1998) .
44. See CAL. BUS. & PROF CODE § § 18895.2-18897.93 (West Supp. 1998) ; MD. CODE ANN.
occur until the reglstratton process has been completed and approved. 45 An exception usually eXISts for student Initiated contact, With the agent required to begin the registratIOn process a set number of days from the contact. 46 The statute may also reqUire the agent to notify the educatIOnal InstItutton before contacting the studentathlete. 47 These statutes do not prOVide guidance for agents if the institution tells an agent that he or she does not have permission to contact the athlete. Some statutes requIre, and a number of educational InstttutlOns host on their own, an offiCial agent interview panel. 48 Any contact which Violates NCAA rules Violates the statute.
The statutes usually mandate that a representation contract contain certain specified clauses. A boldface warning to the athlete that execution of the contract will result In hiS or her loss of eligibility IS the most commonly Imposed term. 49 A few states require nottce to the educational institutIOn before any representatIon contract IS executed, so but most states reqUire a copy of the contract to be filed With the educatIOnal InstItutton Within some deSignated penod after executIOn, typically seventy-two hours or before the athlete's next scheduled game or event, whichever IS sooner. SI Such statutes stipulate that the student-athlete may rescmd the contract withm a specified penod of the date of executIOn. 52 A few states Include an outnght ban on any representation contract between an agent and a student-athlete With remammg eligibility S3 Any contract or contractual mducement that Violates NCAA rules Violates the statute. 54
The § § 49-7-2111 to -2113 (1998) § § 49-7-2111 to -2113 (1998 Although legIslatIve hIstory vanes throughout the states, the typIcal stated purpose of the legIslatIon IS "to regIster athlete agents and to regulate then practIces for the purposes of aVOIding the negatIve Impacts that may result from Improper actIVIty or madequate performance by athlete agents."63 These "negatIve Impacts" are typIcally listed as: (1) student meligibility resultIng III a loss of an athletIC grant-m-ald and the athlete s WIthdrawal from the college or ulllversity pnor to completion of his or her educatIOn; (2) penaltIes, forfeitures, or disqualifications of colleges and Ulllversities whIch hmders theIr partIcIpatIon m mtercolleglate athletIcs; (3) harmful consequences for profeSSIOnal sports; and (4) The National Conference of Commissioners on UnIform State Laws (NCCUSL) has a draft "Uniform Athlete Agents Act" before It for conslderatlOn. 66 The Model Act, which follows the modem trend, adopts the Junsdictlonal reach and substantive provIsions of the broadest current statutes. The general provIsions contained Within the Act's Article One define an "agent" as anyone who contracts With a studentathlete or soliCits, contacts, or recrUIts a student-athlete to sign a representation contract. 67 An "educatIOnal institution" IS described as a "public or pnvate JUnior high school, high school, JUnior college, college, or unIversity that the student-athlete attends, last attended, or to which the student-athlete has expressed wntten mtentlOn to attend."68 Finally, a "student-athlete means an mdivldual who engages In, IS eligible to engage m, or may be eligible presently, or m the future, to engage In any mtercolleglate sporting event, contest, exhibition, or program.,,69 The Act expands Its reach by mcluding a contact ban on any student-athlete who expresses a wntten mtent to attend an In-state mStitutlOn. 70 The registratIOn reqUIrements m the Act's Article Two prevent an agent from contactmg or contractmg With any student-athlete pnor to registratIOn With the state and notificatIOn of the athletiC director at the educatIOnal mstltutlOn.
7I If the student-athlete or someone on hiS or her behalf mltlates the contact With the agent, the agent must file an application for registratIOn and notify the athletiC director wlthm seven days of the contact. 72 The Model Act [Vol. 30 exempts an agent from many of the regIstration details if the agent proves to the state that he or she has regIstered prevIously m another state wIth sImilar reqUlrements.
73
If a student-athlete executes a contract wIth an agent, the contract must contam certam clauses described 10 ArtIcle Three of the Model Act, IOcluding a boldface notIce regarding loss of collegIate eligibility and encouragement of the student-athlete to talk to hIS or her coach before sIgnmg. 74 Withm seventy-two hours of the executIon of the contract, or pnor to the student-athlete's next athletIc event, whIchever comes first, the agent and the student-athlete must notify the athletIc director of the educatIonal mstItutIon. 75 The Model Act also contams a detailed regIstratIOn process (including speCIfied fees, an applicatIon form and proof of liability IOsurance 10 a mlOImum amount of $1 00,000), a student-athlete's nghtto cancel a contract wIthm seven days of executIOn, recordkeepmg reqUIrements and prescribed sanctIOns (including CIvil remedies for the educatIOnal mstItutlOn, admIOlstratIve penaltIes and cnmmal pUOlshment).76
The Model Act therefore embodies most of the prmclples of the "aggressIve" sports legIslatIOn already 10 eXIstence. The Model Act would sanctIon all of the examples prevIOusly discussed. By mcluding jUOlOr hIgh school students wlthm ItS scope, the Model Act potentIally cnmmalizes a conversatIOn between an uncle and hIS eIghth grade nephew, if the uncle states that he will represent the nephew ifhe ever plays m the NFL. Before havlOg that conversatIon, the uncle would be reqUIred to notify the jUOlOr hIgh school athletIc director and regIster WIth the state. As also noted earlier, a local merchant can gIve the seOlor football star of the area high school a $40,000 car to mduce him to attend the state unIversity The payment on behalf of the educatIonal 1OstItutIon does not come wlthm the proscnptIon of the Model Act. Similarly, a coach for a summer Amateur AthletIc UOlon (AAU) basketball team can offer a hIgh school basketball star finanCial mducements to play for hiS summer team and not be wlthm the purview of the Model Act. Finally, If a football player at the UnIversity of GeorgIa returns home to Seattle, Wash1Ogton, after the fall semester of hIS JunIor year WIth the mtent of turn10g profeSSIOnal and not returnmg to Georgia, an agent based wholly 10 Seattle would be subject to GeorgIa law and would need to regIster WIth the state of Georgia and notify the Georgia athletiC director before the Seattle agent could contact the player 10 hiS Seattle home. JUrisdictIOn therefore mvolves principles of terrItoriality and sovereignty which restrict the power of one state to bmd the natlOn. 78 The prinCiples of the dormant Commerce Clause limit any state's ability to tnterfere With the national economy and the free flow of goods and services m mterstate commerce.
79
As such, the Constitution's grant of power to the federal government to control the national economy dictates that no state may favor m-state economic mterests to the detnment of out-of-state bus mess or excessively burden "traffic" m mterstate commerce. so Each of these doctrmes poses Significant questions regarding the validity of state regulation of sports agents.
A. Legislative JUrisdictIOn
The law delineatmg the legislative power of the states IS not very clear or wellestablished. After many years of doctnnal turbulence, the UnIted States Supreme Court has at least clarified a primal concept establishIng the limits of legislative JUrisdictional validity The test created by the Court IS Similar to that enunciated for chOice of law deCISions by the Judicial system: the "State must have a slgmficant contact or Significant aggregatIOn of contacts, creatmg state mterests, such that chOice of its law IS neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfalr."81 The Supreme Court has also tndicated that the appropnate defimtIon of jUrisdictional limitations should not change depending on the Constitutional provIsion selected as the source of the IimltatIon. 82
In general, states may not enact statutes that proscribe conduct outSide their own borders. 83 ASide from thiS agreed upon statement of the general rule, courts and commentators have differed m their application of the Supreme Court concept mentioned above to states' efforts to expand theIr legislative reach. In the context of cnmmallaw, some conduct or the result of some conduct must occur WithIn a state for that state to prosecute a defendant. 84 Under the older theory of subjectIVe terrItonality, the state m which the defendant IS located at the time the Crime was committed has JUrIsdiction to sanctIOn the offense. ss The modern theory of objective terrItonality, however, extends the SituS of the cnme to Include the state where Injury occurred regardless of the defendant's locatIon. 86 The Supreme Court has treated thiS concept of objective terrItOriality as an exception to accepted junsdictIonal notIOns and has therefore limited Its application to acts that are mtended to have, and actually The tests for limltlOg legislatIve Junsdictton In the context of civil regulatory statutes IS differently phrased. Courts m thiS settIng tend to parallel more closely the chOice of law language employed In conflicts of law 90 If leglslattve Junsdictlon IS questtoned In a contracts settIng, the court will examIne the relatIOnship between the state and the contract. If a contract IS neither performed nor executed WithIn the state, leglslattve Junsdictton IS usually lacklOg.
91 If a state attempts to Impose ItS antttrust statute on a defendant, the court will determIne whether the defendant has the requIsite mlmmum contacts With the state to Justtfy the exercise of leglslattve Junsdictton. Such contacts can be few if those contacts, which actually eXist, give nse to the applicatIOn of the statute.
92
The above example of the JUlllor Georgia football player who returns home to tum profeSSIOnal and IS contacted at hiS Seattle home by a Seattle-based agent prOVides a baSIS for asseSSIng the validity of the agent regulatory statutes 10 both their cnmmal and Civil applicatton. In thiS hypothettcal, the agent does not register With the state of Georgia or mform the Umverslty of Georgia of any dealings With the player. The agent contacts the player 10 Seattle, meets him numerous times 10 Seattle and, one month after the mltlal contact, signs the player to a representatton agreement In Seattle. Three months later, the player IS drafted In the first round by the New York Giants and the agent negottates a player contract With the Giants. The Giants play theIr fourth game of the season 10 Atlanta and the agent flies to Atlanta to watch the game. In hIS hotel the Saturday before the game, he IS arrested by Atlanta police for failure to comply WIth Georgia's verSIOn of the Model Act regarding hiS contactIng and slgmng the player. Since the agent was arrested withm the state of Georgia, the state court would have Judicial junsdictlOn over the agent based on physical presence withm the state. 93 In the ensulOg trial, a prelim mary questton would be whether Georgia had legislatIve junsdictlon sufficient to justify makmg the WashlOgton activIties cnmmal 10 GeorgIa. If the agent regulation statute were seen as cnmmal, Georgia would not appear to have legislative junsdictlOn over the agent. The player's loss or renunciatIOn of hiS remalOmg collegiate eligibility would not satisfy the mtended effects test applied 10 a cnmmal context. As noted above, a mere deleterIOUS effect on a citizen or state entity IS not enough to justify legislatIve junsdictlOn. 94 If the statute was perceived as a Civil regulation and the contacts test was employed, the state would still lack legislative junsdictlon smce the agent had no contact With Georgla.
95 Therefore, the most far-reachlOg statutes, such as the Model Act, contam senous JUrIsdictIOnal defects as applied to agents who have never entered the state. The states possess greater junsdictlonal credibility regarding statutes which regulate agent activIties which actually occur 10 the state. Therefore, if a representatIon contract was executed wlthm the state, or the agent made a number of tripS lOto the state to meet With the athlete, the test for civil legislative junsdictlon would appear to be satisfied. Ifan out-of-state agent, however, merely telephoned an athlete 10-state and then met the player at away games and tripS to the agent's out of state office, state Civil junsdictlOn would still be senously questIOned.
B. Dormant Commerce Clause
In the absence of federal legislation, the ConstitutIon's mandate that the federal government shall regulate mterstate commerce has been construed as limitIng the ability of the states to control economic matters. 96 The Supreme Court has declared that thiS "dormant" Commerce Clause doctrme can be Violated by a state 10 anyone of three ways: (1) a state favonng the economic Interests of Its reSidents over those of out-of-state entitIes seekIng to do busmess wlthm the state (protectIOOlsm); (2) regulation by a state or states creatmg the Impermissible nsk of mconslstent regulatIOn by different states of the same economic entity or creatmg a cumulatIve burden which stifles the economic actIvity; or (3) a state plaCIng a burden on the free flow of goods and services 10 mterstate commerce which outweighs the local benefits the state IS attemptIng to advance. 93. See People v. Blume, 505 N.W.2d 843,855 (Mich. 1993 See CTS Corp. v. DynamIcs Corp. of AmerIca, 481 U.S. 69, 87-89 (1987) .
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ProtectIonism
A state statute can exhibit traces of protectlomsm either on Its face, 10 its purpose, or 10 Its effect.98 The sports agent legislation IS clearly neutral on Its face because all agents who contact or contract with defined athletes are subject to regulation, regardless ofthetr residence. Therefore, m-state and out-of-state economic entitles are treated Similarly by the state. The purpose underlymg these statutes IS also neutral. A state deSires to "protect" Its athletes and NCAA mstltutlons from all agents, m-state and out-of-state 10 ongm. The effect of the statute does not Impose burdens only upon out-of-state agents. Therefore, as currently drafted, the states' regulation of agents does not appear to VIOlate the prohibition agamst protectlomsm.
Impossibility or Cumulative Burden
State statutes may also be mvalidated under the dormant Commerce Clause because of the multipliCity of states who have or may enact diffenng statutes. In such a SituatIOn, compliance With all of the statutes needed to conduct an agent's natIOnal busmess may be Impossible or, at the least, extremely difficult. 99 
Dormant
Commerce Clause Junsprudence would mvalidate the statutes on either the real or hypothetical Impossibility of compliance With all statutes, or the Impermissible burden placed on a natIonal busmess by the sheer volume of statutory reqUirements. 100 Many statutes reqUire sports agents to submit a surety bond to the state treasurer 10 amounts rangmg from $10,000 to $100,000 as one of the requIrements for obtammg a sports agent license.
lol This financial burden, multiplied by the number of states With such a reqUirement, may make compliance With each statute Impossible. The statutes currently 10 eXistence, however, do not expressly make illegal 10 one state an actIOn that IS expressly legal or specifically mandated 10 another. 102 Therefore, compliance With all statutes, while difficult, IS, 10 fact, possible. The eXistent array of regulatory legislation would not appear to Violate the Impossibility of compliance branch of the dormant Commerce Clause doctnne.
The multipliCity ofregulatlOns hamper an mdustry that IS unquestIOnably natIOnal 10 scope. The diffenng state regulations place a cumulative burden on mterstate commerce which IS unacceptable under dormant Commerce Clause theory 103 The broad applicability of the most aggressive legislation makes It Impossible for an agent to know, pnor to contactmg the athlete, what regulations may be applicable. In order to protect himself or herself from Civil and cnmmalliability, an agent must comply wIth the regulatIon of every state, no matter how costly, on the off chance that a prospecttve client mIght have some distant tte to that state. ThIs reality means, m effect, that the most restrIctIve leglslatton must be followed In order to aVOId a VIOlatIon. The sheer volume of compliance makes It difficult or Impossible to mamtam a natIonal busmess. The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits such a result. In additIon, such a "mandated" natIOnal compliance WIth the statutes of the most restrIctIve states VIolates the dormant Commerce Clause because those states are gIven authority well beyond theIr borders and are, m effect, exerclsmg the power to regulate the nattonal economy 104 Such control as stated m the ConstItutIon IS exclUSIvely federal and, therefore, beyond the authorIty of any state or states.
Balancmg
In addition to exammmg the burden multtple regulations Impose on an mdustry, a related, but separate, dormant Commerce Clause analYSIS compares the burden on mterstate commerce with the Importance of local benefits derIved from the state legIslatIOn. lOS The Supreme Court has enunCIated several descrIpttons of the approprIate welghmg and balancmg of interests requIred by the ConstitutIon. If the state statute advances an "important" state purpose, the burden on Interstate commerce should probably be declared mCldental unless a "specIal" need eXIsts for natIOnal uOlformlty withm the mdustry 106 A slightly different formulatIon of the balanCing test states that the legIslatIon will be upheld unless the burden on mterstate commerce IS excessIve m relatIon to putatIve local benefits. 10' A court should also take Into account the nature of the local mterest and whether It can be promoted by other means whIch will have less Impact on mterstate actIvItIes. lOS As noted prevIOusly, most states assert four JustificatIons for these statutes. 109 The state's concern for the athlete's educatIon IS tempered by the low graduatIon rates m most DiVISIon I football and basketball programs and a subordination of academIC concerns to athlettc Interests while the athlete IS actually attending the college or uOlverslty 110 Concern for the disqualificatIOn of the student and the mstttutlon should dictate that coaches and alumOl or boosters who VIolate NCAA rules should also come WIthin the purview of the act. I II Any negattve publiCity directed towards profeSSIOnal sports IS clearly temporary and not of any real concern to the state. The actual purpose of these statutes IS to protect the competItIveness and profitability of [Vol. 30 m-state teams m the big revenue sports of men's football and basketball. l12 Although probably cntlcal to m-state fans and the local electorate, these purposes would not appear to be terribly lII1:portant In the mandated balancmg reqUired by the Constitution. The burden of complymg With these various state statutes significantly hampers an entIre mdustry, which IS clearly natIOnal m scope.1l3 The state purposes motlvatmg the statute are tnvlal and provmclal. In the balancmg reqUired by the Supreme Court, the burden on mterstate commerce would, therefore, appear to outweigh any state's mterest m keepmg ItS collegiate athletes playmg for the local school and avoiding NCAA sancttons.
III. NATIONAL REGULATION
To date, the federal government has not passed natIOnal legislatIon dealing With the sports agent mdustry Congress, however, has recently considered two such proposals.11 4 In additIOn, the umons of all the major profeSSIOnal sports now regulate the conduct of certified agents m their sports. These umon regulattons proscribe many activItIes by sports agents as unethical, mcluding many practices that are regulated by the state statutes. liS
A. Congress
In 1996, Congress considered an amendment to Title 18 of the U.S. Code that would have prohibited sports agents from "influencmg" college athletes to term mate their eligibility to participate m mtercolleglate athletIcs. 116 Rather than requmng registration and licensmg for athlete agents, the bill, through ItS defimtlOn of the term "influence," essentially cnmmalized any contact between an agent and a college athlete.1I7 The bill defined "athlete agent" as anyone who soliCits a college athlete to enter mto a contract authorIzmg such person to represent the athlete m marketmg hiS or her athletiC ability liS "College athlete" was defined as anyone enrolled m an undergraduate or graduate degree grantmg program who either participates m or has mformed the school m wntmg of an mtent to participate m mtercolleglate athlettcs. 119 This bill would have prOVided a smgle natIOnal rule for agents, but It would not have Significantly clanfied the field. The concept of "influencmg" IS vague unless It IS enforced to the extreme ofbanmng all contact between the agent and athlete. The bill also did not clearly pre-empt the registratIOn and licensmg reqUirements of the states. I2O A second attempt to enact a national sports agent statute was made m Congress m 1997 Rather than sanctIOnmg agents for mfluencmg student-athletes, thIs bill provIdes for the extensIve regulatIon seen m most of the current state statutes. 122 First, the bill prohibits contact between an agent and any student-athlete currently subject to the rules and regulations of the NCAA or the NJCAA.123 Upon the first VIOlatIOn of the statute, an agent would be prohibIted from representmg any studentathlete who attends the college or umverslty at whIch the offense occurred.
124 Any subsequent violation would subject the agent to convIction of a Class C felony and a fine. 125 The statute also regulates the contractual language m representatIOn agreements between student-athletes and agents, specifically reqUlrmg notificatIOn m bold type that contractmg wIth an agent will termmate the student-athlete s eligibility to participate m mtercolleglate athletIcs. 126 The educatIonal mstItutIon must be notified of the agreement wlthm seventy-two hours of Its creatIOn and the athlete IS granted a twenty-day reClSlon penod.
127 Most Importantly for notice purposes, the statute limIts the defimtlOn of student-athlete to "any athlete who practices for or otherwise partiCIpates m mtercolleglate athletics at any college or umverslty ,,128 This bill was referred to the Committee on EducatIon and the Workforce on July 16, 1997 and IS still pending. 129 A Congressional statute regulatmg sports agents would clearly be wlthm Congress' power pursuant to the Commerce Clause. no The passage of a natIOnal regulatIOn would seem to benefit all the parties concerned with mtercollegIate athletics. The schools would receive protectIOn for their financial and athletiC mterests. The agents would only have one registratIOn and one set of regulations With which to comply The serIOUS questions regarding the validity of state statutes m connectIOn with legIslative JunsdictIon and the dormant Commerce Clause would be elimmated. The mconslstencles m current state law could be elimmated by encompassmg wlthm a federal statute the activities of coaches, alumm, and boosters. Even federal legIslatIon, however, does not serIously examme whether thiS type of statute IS fair to the student-athlete. Although such a natIOnal statute would e1immate the techmcal, legal objections to state regulatIOn of sports agents, the larger questIOn of whether any legislatIOn glvmg NCAA rules the force of law IS a proper functIOn of government would remam unasked and unanswered. 13 I The majorIty of Congress may m fact be ImpliCitly mdicatmg their opmlon by their failure to take any meanmgful actIOn on the pending legislatIOn. To date, no federal statute appears close to passage.
The activities of college coaches and school boosters, which equally threaten loss of eligibility and revenue, will contmue With no fear of legal sanction.
AthletiCS are best left to private, not public, regulation. The codes of conduct of professional sports uDlons are an example of pnvate sector activity that can control at least the most flagrant abuses performed by sports agents. The NCAA should cntically evaluate its eXisting rules and honestly discuss whether they make sense tn the modem economic realities of DivIsion I football and basketball. Governmental regulation of sports agents IS mhibIting the effective workmg of the marketplace tn athletics and delaymg an effective resolution of deeper Issues regarding amateunsm and the proper role of educational mstltutIons m a multi-billion dollar athletiC and entertamment mdustry
